Kurdistan Portal

Das hier möchte ich euch nicht vorenthalten, denn das ist brandheiss!

Im Internet geistern schon seit ein paar Monaten alle ca. 250.000 Botschaftskabel herum. Stichwortsuchen
waren bisher nur mit sehr aufwendigen Mitteln zu bewerkstelligen.

Nun aber gibt es eine Webseite, die genau das sehr unkompliziert ermöglicht.
Unter den Stichwörtern Kurdistan, BDP, PKK, Barzani ect. finden sich gleich Hunderte von diesen teilweise
als top secret eingestuften Botschaftskabel.

Alle Botschaftskabel sind unzensiert!

Wer es also ganz genau wissen will, braucht sich nur zu bedienen!


http://cablesearch.org/

Min fam nekir, worum geht es denn hier? Was ist ein Botschaftskabel?

@ Rezgar

Botschaftskabel sind interne Nachichtenübermittlungen von den verschiedensten US-Konsulaten mit unterschiedlichen
Geheimhaltungsstufen. Sozusagen der globale Nachrichtenaustausch des US-Statedepartments.

Von den über 250.000 Kabeln stammen über 8.000 alleine aus der US-Botschaft in Ankara.

Der inhaltliche Bezug zu Kurdistan allgemein ist überpräsent. Deshalb hat diese Quelle für alle jene Priorität,
die wissen wollen, was sich genau im Hintergrund ereignete.
 
Eine Gesamtanalyse aller Botschaftskabel ist jedoch für eine Einzelperson schlicht und einfach nicht zu bewältigen!

Jeder kann jetzt, da die Möglichkeit dazu besteht, selber entscheiden, wie man damit arbeiten könnte.

Hier mal ein Beispiel: Sorry, englisch vorausgesetzt

ID 10ANKARA126
SUBJECT SECRETARY GATES' TURKEY BILATERAL VISIT:
DATE 2010-01-26 00:00:00
CLASSIFICATION SECRET
ORIGIN    Embassy Ankara
TEXT  S E C R E T ANKARA 000126


Retrograde through Turkey
-------------------------

12. (S) Turkey's agreement to allow us to use its territory,
facilities and airspace has been essential to our ability to
support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We now look to
expand current capabilities to transit materiel from Iraq to
join up with the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to
Afghanistan. CENTCOM logisticians, working with us and our
EUCOM Office of Defense Cooperation, seek to take advantage
of improved commercial ties between Turkey and Iraq to move
non-lethal equipment across Turkey to join the NDN. We are
working to expand our current retrograde agreements to
minimize the time and bureaucracy involved, and to expand
permissions to allow non-lethal military equipment, including
armored transport vehicles.

Advocacy for U.S. Defense Industry
----------------------------------

13. (C) We much appreciate SecDef's help in advocating for
U.S. firms competing for key projects in Turkey, and hope he
can raise both Sikorsky's and Raytheon's cases in person.
Sikorsky's "International Blackhawk" proposal holds
remarkable benefits. This deal represents a new level of
industrial partnership; Sikorsky guarantees that it would
build in Turkey - for sale outside of Turkey - one Blackhawk
for each one the GOT builds and buys for itself; this is a
boon of hundreds of millions of dollars for the Turkish
economy. On Air Defense, Raytheon's PAC-3 is competing in a
tender for Turkey's air defense. Raytheon also seeks to take
advantage of Turkish industry's ability to co-produce complex
systems with us and would produce systems for sale in the UAE
and elsewhere. The benefit to Turkey's economy from such
co-production would likely exceed USD 1 billion. Technically
and operationally, there is no system which can compete with
the PAC-3, but Turkey's Defense Ministry seeks to broaden
competition to include lower-cost options from Russia and
even from European producers. Raytheon often asks us to
remind the Turks that a decision on requests for support on
Missile Defense should not necessarily affect a decision on
PAC-3.

UAV's, Attack Helicopters, and Intel Surge
------------------------------------------

14. (C) Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own
ISR capability to replace the US assets currently being used
in anti-PKK operations. President Obama told PM Erdogan in
December that we support Turkey's request to acquire armed
Reaper UAVs. Nevertheless, approval for armed Reapers is
complicated due to Hill concerns. We have explained this to
the Turks. However, even if those could be overcome, the
delivery pipeline for these systems is long, and Turkey's
leaders have sought reassurance that we will not pull our
intelligence support until they can replace it. While we are
working to enhance Turkey's ISR capabilities, we have not
made this commitment to date.

15. (C) Bad GOT procurement decisions led Turkey to a severe
shortage of dual engine, high altitude attack helicopters,
which it desperately needs to fight the PKK. PM Erdogan
raised this issue with the President in December 2009; SecDef
should expect this issue to be a top priority in meetings
with Minister Gonul and with GEN Basbug. The Turks took
SecDef's May 2009 letter to provide up to four AH-1W
helicopters each in 2011, 2012 and 2013 as a firm commitment,
and now have asked us to advance that date to 2010. They do
not accept our explanation that these aircraft are simply not
available from our inventory, as they believe they have --
just like the U.S. -- "troops in contact" and need the close
tactical support. While SecDef should make no commitment, we
should also explore whether we can persuade TAIWAN to sell or
lease some of its own AH-1W aircraft now that TAIWAN is
taking delivery of Apaches.

Zur allgemeinen Information:

"cable", kurz für "cablegram" ist das gute alte Telegramm, also eine über (Transatlantik-)Kabel übertragene Nachricht.

Im konkreten Falle eine Nachrichtenverbindung, heute draht- und kabellos über Nachrichtensatelliten, zwischen hier der US-Regierung, exakt deren Außenministerium ("state department" oder auch Department of State, abgekürzt DoS) und deren Botschaften in anderen Ländern.

Der US Soldat Bradley Manning, damals stationiert im Irak, und aufgrund seiner fachlichen Kompetenz im Umgang mit Datenfluss in einer Militärdenststelle beschäftigt, wo er sich mutmaßlich Zugang zu dem geheimen Datenverkehrt seiner Regierung verschaffen konnte, bzw. mehr oder weniger zufällig darauf stieß.

Er empörte sich über den Inhalt vieler dieser Nachrichten und versuchte, so die Vorwürfe seitens der US-Regierung gegen ihn, dieses öffentlich zu machen. Ihm schien es mutmaßlich sinnvoll, sich damit an Wikileaks zu wenden und diesen Datenverkehr auf diese Weise öffentlich zu machen.

Das fand seine Regierung aber gar nicht lustig, und so sitzt er nun in einem Militärgefängnis in total überwachter Einzelhaft, "incommunicado" wie man das dort nennt, ähnlich abgeschottet wie Abdullah Öcalan, vielleicht sogar noch weit "wirksamer".

Seine Homosexualität tut ein Übriges ihn für die Mehrheit der Menschen in seinem Heimatland zur "Unperson" zu machen.

Hier noch ein relativ aktuelles Botschaftskabel aus Bagdad vom 23.02.2010.
Dem Text sind beabsichtigte Massnahmen der US-Streitkräfte im Iraq, dem türkischen Botschafter und dem Innenminister der
KRG,  zur Vernichtung der PKK zu entnehmen.

Wenn man diese Massnahmen jedoch genauer betrachtet, so wird sehr klar, dass die Planer im letzten Jahr mit ihrem
Latein am Ende waren. Keiner der geplanten Massnahmen wurde in einer unverkennbaren Form umgesetzt;
aus welchem Grund auch immer. Und die USF-I wurde vor kurzem demobilisiert.

Wen wundert es also, dass die TSK jetzt Familienangehörige von Korucis in Robosky massakriert?


ID 10BAGHDAD481
SUBJECT USF-I COUNTER PKK ACTION PLAN
DATE 2010-02-23 00:00:00
CLASSIFICATION SECRET
ORIGIN    Embassy Baghdad
TEXT S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000481

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2020
TAGS: IZ, MARR, PREL, PTER, TU
SUBJECT: USF-I COUNTER PKK ACTION PLAN

REF: A. ANKARA 267 B. ANKARA 268 C. EMAIL FEB 19 AMB
JEFFREY TO AMB HILL

Classified By: Acting PMA W.S. Reid for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S) SUMMARY: USF-I is drafting a joint action plan to
recommend initiatives for the GOT and GOI to consider in
combating the PKK following a visit to Ankara by USF-I
Commanding General Ray Odierno on February 3. Turkish
Ambassador to Iraq, Murat Ozcelik, on February 17 presented
two action plans to both USF-I and KRG officials that the GOT
hopes will be incorporated into the final USF-I draft plan.
The main objective of the Turkish plan is the termination of
the PKK presence in Northern Iraq as soon as possible. Post
will report the final USF-I draft plan upon its completion
septel. END SUMMARY.

USF-I DRAFT ACTION PLAN
-------------------------

2. (S) Following a visit to Ankara by USF-I Commanding
General Ray Odierno on February 3 (refs A and B), USF-I is
drafting a joint action plan to improve counter-terrorism
pressure on the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) operating out
of Northern Iraq. During his meetings with high-level GOT
officials, Odierno agreed that USF-I would draft a joint
action plan that would immediately begin to address ways to
stop the financial and logistics flow to the PKK as well as
other more whole of government initiatives. Some of the
desired effects of the USF-I draft plan include neutralizing
PKK support networks, increasing collaboration between the
GOT/GOI/KRG and preventing any unilateral military action by
the GOT in Northern Iraq. Elements proposed by the Turkish
Action Plans (outlined in following paragraphs) will be
incorporated into the USF-I joint plan. The USF-I plan,
currently being drafted, will be reported septel. Upon
completion, the draft plan will be presented at the next
Trilateral Working Group meeting to all participating members
(GOI representatives, KRG representative and Turkish
representatives).

TURKISH ACTION PLANS
--------------------------------

3. (S) On February 17, Turkish Ambassador Murat Ozcelik
presented MG Steven Hummer (USF-I, J3 Operations) with two
Turkish Actions Plans to counter the PKK. The first, "Action
Plan of the Republic of Turkey" outlined objectives and
measures to be taken immediately following the March 7
parliamentary elections. The objective of the plan is
"Termination of the armed presence of the Kongra-Gel (PKK)
terrorist organization in Northern Iraq as soon as possible."
The main operational goals to meet the objective include: 1)
"the elimination of operational capabilities and facilities
of the terrorist organization," 2) "blocking the flow of
logistical support," 3) "the termination of its liaison and
communication facilities," and 4) "taking necessary measures
with a view to preventing the liaison of the terrorist
organization with its connections especially in Europe,
regarding operational capabilities and communication with the
international community/press."

4. (S) The plan outlines 11 measures through which the GOT
hopes to achieve the objectives outlined above. The first
measure calls for "messages strongly emphasizing that the
Government of the Republic of Turkey acts resolutely together
with the US Administration, Iraqi Central Government (GOI)
and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and that the
Qand the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and that the
presence of any terrorist organization on Iraqi soils will
not be tolerated should be disseminated the USA, the GOI and
the KRG, to the terrorist organization and the wider public
opinion." The other measures include 1) making use of all US
and KRG human and signal intelligence sources, 2) applying
psychological and physical pressure, 3) stricter controls at
Erbil airport, 4) arresting those individuals currently in
Iraq who have arrest warrants issued against them, 5)
"real-time tracking" of PKK leadership movements, 6)
implementing a propaganda campaign by the KRG to convince
non-hardliners to "come down from the mountains," 7)
confiscating all ammunition and weapons of the organization,
8.) cutting off ties between the PKK and Makhmour Refugee Camp
and returning those residents who wish to do so to Turkey, 9)
cooperation with Syria, Iran and other governments whose
citizens are a part of the PKK and 10) incorporating these
measures into the joint US/Turkey action plan. (NOTE:
Full texts of both plans have been sent to the Department and
Embassy Ankara. END NOTE.)

5. (S) The second plan, entitled "Joint Action Plan",
outlines "measures expected to be taken by the KRG after
March 7, 2010." The Joint Action Plan includes nine measures
to be taken by the KRG (which overlap with the first nine
measures outlined in the Action Plan in para 3). Per a
conversation with Ambassador Jeffrey in Ankara (ref C),
Ozcelik stated that he presented this plan to KRG Minister of
Interior Karim Sinjari at the end of last week. There has
been no indications that either of these plans have been
discussed with or presented by the GOT to the Iraqi central
government.
FORD
HEADER
   VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0481/01 0541153
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231153Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6780
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0707
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE